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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to empirically assess the relationship existing between local financial development and 
the growth of firms, with a special focus on cooperatives. More in detail, the interest is in investigating whether 
local banking development impacts differently on the growth of cooperative firms, as compared to partnerships and 
corporations. To pursue this aim, using Italian data, a multiplicative interaction model is specified, so as to allow 
the impact of local banking development to differ between cooperative and non-cooperative firms. This empirical 
strategy presents the distinctive advantage of offering a direct test of the hypothesis of institutional complementari-
ty between specific features of banking institutions (i.e. their degree of development) and of firms (i.e. the legal 
form they assume). The main finding is that although local banking development represents a determinant of firms’ 
growth, regardless of their legal structure, it plays a special role in boosting the growth of cooperatives: as local 
banking markets become more developed, cooperatives tend to grow at a rate higher than non-cooperative firms. 
This result provides, therefore, evidence in favor to the existence of an institutional complementarity relationship 
between the development of local banking institutions and cooperative firms. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The role of financial development is an issue of great interest in the analysis of the determinants of 
cooperative firms’ growth, as it interrelates with a far more reaching research topic - the financing of 
cooperatives - which has received considerable attention in the economic literature. Although there ex-
ists an almost unanimous consensus in considering internal financing neither sustainable nor efficient, 
scholars do not reach a likewise agreement when it comes to evaluate the effectiveness of external chan-
nels in satisfying the financial needs of worker-owned firms. The mixed results existing on this issue 
represent the main motivation inspiring this work. 
On the one hand, mainstream contributions conclude that accessing external financing entails a se-
ries of problems for cooperative firms, which result in credit rationing and higher cost of capital. These 
constraints not only hinder cooperatives’ growth prospect, but, more severely, interpose obstacles to their 
creation, functioning and survival (Vanek, 1977; Putterman, 1982, 1993; Levin, 1984; Ben-Ner, 1988; 
Drèze, 1993; Dow, 2003). On the other hand, studies belonging to the more recent institutionalist debate 
argue that in the presence of supportive institutions, finance might not be a concern for cooperatives (Es-
trin et al, 1988; Bonin et al, 1993; Smith, 2001; Mathews, 2002 and Stiglitz, 2004). Moreover, these 
contributions tend to stress that since in several countries cooperative firms still represent a long lasting 
and significant phenomenon, this signals that - at least in certain cases - the financial matter has been go-
verned and concretely tackled (Zevi, 2005), probably thanks to the existence of supportive financial in-
stitutions (Smith, 2001). 
These new institutional conclusions, although fascinating and non trivial, appear still far from being 
exhaustive, thus calling for further inquiry. To this end, the contribution of the present work is to inves-
tigate the effects of local banking development on the growth of cooperative firms. According to the re-
levant literature, banking development is an important factor influencing firms’ resources acquisition, 
hence their economic performance. Indeed, it has been argued that a more developed banking sector is 
more effective in screening and monitoring investors, thus increasing the efficiency of resource alloca-
tion (see Goldsmith, 1969 and Greenwood et al, 1990, among others). This greater ability to collect and 
process information may result in lower costs of bank financing (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) and greater 
availability of funds (Bencivenga et al, 1991; Levine, 1992). Furthermore, these positive effects may be 
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particularly beneficial for firms that are more dependent upon financial intermediaries for their external 
financing (Benfratello et al, 2006). 
The arguments just discussed make it of great interest to investigate whether the growth of coopera-
tive firms is influenced by local banking development. To render the analysis more exhaustive, beside 
cooperatives also partnerships and corporations are taken into account. This choice appears to be rele-
vant since it allows to assess whether local banking development impacts differently on the growth of 
diverse enterprises, hence permitting to evaluate for which business type, if any, it exerts a stronger in-
fluence. The working hypothesis is that financial development could be especially beneficial for those 
firms, such as cooperatives, that are particularly dependent on banks for their external financing. In or-
der to address the research question, the analysis developed in this paper tests empirically this hypothe-
sis by applying the institutional complementarity approach. In general terms, a relationship of institu-
tional complementarity among the characteristics of various market governance mechanisms requires 
that the effectiveness, or the presence, of one governance mechanism is reinforced - either directly or 
indirectly - by the presence of a specific arrangement prevailing in the same or embedding domain (Ao-
ki, 2001). Applying this concept to the issues investigated in this work, the interest is in assessing 
whether specific features of banking institutions (i.e. their degree of development) and of firms (i.e. the 
legal form they assume) are complementary in the sense that the effectiveness of firms (evaluated in 
terms of their growth rate) is reinforced by the presence of a particular order characterizing the finan-
cial domain (i.e. the degree of development of banking institutions). 
To test this hypothesis, the empirical analysis is carried out on a sample of firms operating in the 
Italian provinces during the period 1995-2003. Implementing the analysis at the province level, which is 
the relevant local market in the Italian case, is important because there is significant evidence that credit 
markets are sub-national - particularly for small firms (Kwast et al, 1997; Bonaccorsi di Patti et al, 
2001a), so that distance matters in the provision of funds (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Bofondi et al, 2003). 
Moreover, in Italy the structure of the banking industry differs substantially across local markets and this 
provides sufficient cross-sectional variability within a single institutional framework (Bonaccorsi di Pat-
ti et al, 2004). 
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Several features distinguish this work from the extant literature. Indeed, for the first time, the institu-
tional complementarity approach is adopted to analyze the relationship between local financial devel-
opment and firm growth, and this is particularly important if one considers that - although various theo-
retical treatments of the issue of institutional complementarities have been offered - the supporting em-
pirical base is still extremely limited. Furthermore, even though previous research has investigated the 
impact of financial development on firm growth, this work enriches the existing literature by exploring 
the possibility that this effect may vary among different business types. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the main literature proposed 
on the issue of financial development, with a special focus on the reasons that make it relevant for coop-
erative firms; Section 3 briefly discusses the institutional complementarity approach; Section 4 specifies 
the measures of firm growth and banking development used, as well as the econometric specification; 
Section 5 describes the data employed to implement the empirical analysis; Section 6 presents and dis-
cusses the results obtained and the sensitivity checks performed; finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
 
2. THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
The relationship between financial development and economic performance has been analyzed by a 
substantial body of literature. In this line of study, several contributions investigated the economic ef-
fects of more developed banking institutions, since bank debt represents for many firms, especially 
small and medium sized ones, the dominant source of external financing (on this point see, for instance, 
Cesarini, 2003; Onida, 2004). A common conclusion reached by these studies is that financial develop-
ment impacts on firms’ ability to grow, hence on countries’ growth prospects (see, among others, King 
and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Bekaert et al, 2005).1 
The debate on the channels by which financial institutions affect the real economy centers on the rela-
tive importance of different, but interrelated, effects. The first one, is that better financial intermediation 
improves the efficiency of investments, even when it does not increase their level. In other words, finan-
cial development facilitates better screening and monitoring of investors by banks and this raises the mar-
ginal productivity of capital (Goldsmith, 1969; Greenwood et al, 1990; Fernandez et al, 1994). Evidence 
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in favor to this view is offered, among others, by De Gregorio et al. (1995) and Jayaratne et al. (1996). 
These latter authors analyze the economic impact of the American intrastate branch banking reform. This 
amendment, which affected banking in 35 states since the early 1970s, relaxed restrictions on intrastate 
branching by both permitting bank holding companies to consolidate bank subsidiaries into branches and 
easing de novo branching state-wide. Jayaratne et al. (1996) find evidence that the real per capita growth 
rate increased significantly following intrastate branch reform. They also find that bank lending quality is 
the main channel through which this financial sector reform influenced economic growth. 
Related to the just discussed channel, financial development can improve the economic performance 
at both firm and industry level by reducing the cost of raising funds from sources external to the firm, 
relative to the cost of internally generated cash flows (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). In broad terms, exter-
nal funds are thought to be costlier because outsiders have less control over borrower’s actions (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976) or because they know less about what the borrower will do with the funds (Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1981; Myers et al, 1984). Under such circumstances, financial development - in the form of 
better accounting and disclosure rules, and better corporate governance through institutions - reduces the 
wedge between the cost of internal and external funds and enhances growth, especially for firms that are 
mostly reliant on external financing (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Benfratello et al, 2006). 
Strictly related to this mechanism, is the role that financial development plays with regard to the as-
pect of credit availability and, thus, in fostering investment levels. According to several studies, pio-
neered by works as McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), a more developed financial sector is better able 
to mobilize a larger amount of savings and translate them into investments. In other words, financial in-
stitutions insure individuals and firms against the risks associated with their liquidity needs, thus allow-
ing them to invest in productive assets and technologies (Bencivenga et al, 1991; Levine, 1992; Saint-
Paul, 1992, only to quote a few). 
Among the empirical analyses carried out on these issues, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (1998) provide a 
micro-level test of the hypothesis advanced by King and Levine (1993) and Levine and Zervos (1998) 
that the extent to which financial markets and intermediaries are developed is a determinant of growth. 
More precisely, in order to investigate how differences in financial systems affect firms’ use of external 
financing to finance growth, the authors estimate a financial planning model. This enables them to ob-
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tain the maximum growth rate that each firm in their thirty-country sample could attain without access-
ing long-term financing. Then, these predicted growth rates are compared to those realized by firms in 
countries with differing degree of development in their legal and financial systems. The main finding of 
this work is that firms in countries having active and more developed financial markets are better able to 
obtain external finance and grow faster. 
In another interesting study, Dehejia et al. (2003) use data on U.S. state bank branching and deposit 
insurance regulation, which they consider an exogenous source of variation in financial development. The 
authors show that changes in state banking regulations have a significant impact on financial develop-
ment, as proxied by the level and growth of bank loans. They also find evidence that banking develop-
ment impacts on components of growth: it facilitates the shift from the agricultural to the manufacturing 
sector, has a positive effect on human capital accumulation and also on wealth acquisition. 
Using a firm-level survey database covering 44 countries, Beck et al. (2003) analyze the relationship 
between firm size and the development of banking institutions and legal protection of investors. With 
regard to the former aspect, which is more prominent for the issues under discussion, the authors find 
that there exists a positive relationship between the level of development of a country’s banking system 
and firm size. Furthermore, this impact is stronger for firms that depend more heavily on external 
finance. Continuing to employ a firm-level survey database, this time covering 54 countries, Beck et al. 
(2005) find that financial and institutional development weakens the constraining effects of financial, 
legal and corruption obstacles to firm growth. They also find that small firms, which are those more 
constrained by corruption, benefit the most from financial development. 
Working on Italian data, Guiso et al. (2004) investigate the effect of financial development within 
regions. To measure financial development, these authors build a local indicator of how much more like-
ly an individual is to obtain credit in a region, rather than in another one. Therefore, this index is a 
measure of how easy it is for an individual to borrow at the local level and is based on the notion that 
developed financial markets grant individuals and firms easier access to external funds. The empirical 
analysis finds strong effects of local financial development: in more financially developed regions indi-
viduals are more likely to become entrepreneurs at a younger age; more firms are created and firms grow 
more; finally, per capita income is higher. 
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Recently, Benfratello et al. (2006) have analyzed the impact of local banking development on the 
innovative activity of Italian firms during the period 1992-2000. They find that local banking develop-
ment, as measured by branch density, has a positive effect on the probability that a firm introduces a 
process or product innovation. In particular, for process innovation the effect is larger for small firms 
operating in more high-tech sectors and in sectors characterized by a greater need of external finance. 
To sum up, the literature surveyed in this section, summarized in schematic form in table 1, strongly 
supports - both at the micro and macro levels - the existence of a close link between financial develop-
ment and economic performance, thus providing scope to inquiry into the effects of local financial de-
velopment for the growth of different typologies of enterprises. 
 
[Insert table 1] 
 
 
2.1 Why should financial development matter for the growth of cooperatives? 
 
The role of financial development assumes a particular relevance in the analysis of the determinants 
of cooperative firms’ growth, if one considers the controversial debate existing in the literature on the 
financing of cooperatives, along with the characteristics of cooperatives’ financial structure and firm-
specific resources. Indeed, although there exists an almost unanimous consensus in considering internal 
financing neither sustainable nor efficient, due to the bias toward short-term investment and/or underin-
vestment created by the so-called horizon problem (Pejovich, 1969; Furubotn and Pejovich, 1970, and 
Vanek, 1970, 1977),2 scholars do not reach a likewise agreement when it comes to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of external channels in providing worker-owned firms the required financial resources. 
The main source of external financing for cooperatives has typically been bank credit. However, it 
has been argued that compared to other typologies of enterprises, the bank-firm link is more complex 
for cooperatives, as these latter face more difficulties in raising the required external capital, due to 
the problem of guarantees offered to third parties financing the firm (Jossa and Cuomo, 1997). On the 
one hand, in fact, workers’ typical limited wealth bounds the personal collateral available for obtain-
ing loans (Ben-Ner, 1988); moreover, on the other hand, the so-called cooperatives’ vaguely defined 
property rights (Cook, 1995) create a commitment problem of members (Schlicht et al, 1977), which 
makes agency problems in credit markets more severe for these firms than for other business types, so 
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that cooperatives are likely to face higher costs of capital and credit rationing (Drèze, 1993; Putterman, 
1993; Dow, 2003).3  
The difficulties that cooperators might face in obtaining or providing financial capital for their firm 
have been used as an argument against the viability of cooperatives (Blair et al, 2000). Indeed, a major 
conclusion reached by the mainstream literature on cooperative firms so far discussed is that employees’ 
limited wealth and consequent risk aversion and liquidity constraints, combined with cooperatives’ atyp-
ical property rights structure, pose severe limits to the creation, functioning and survival of this organi-
zational mode of firm (see, among others, Vitaliano, 1983; Drèze, 1993 and Putterman, 1993). 
Despite the widespread theoretical consensus that such a conception of the cooperative firm enjoyed 
for a long time, several objections to it have been lately put forward by studies mainly belonging to the 
institutionalist literature. A common feature of the contributions proposed within this strand of analysis 
is to have stressed the role played by institutions in favoring cooperatives’ flourishing and success. 
These contributions, in fact, do not find particular problems with regard to the effectiveness of external 
sources of financing, once a set of supportive financial institutions is present (Estrin et al, 1988; Bonin et 
al, 1993; Smith, 2001). It has, indeed, been argued that since the problems arising in the presence of 
credit market failures4 are particularly acute when financial institutions have scarce experience in lend-
ing to cooperatives, the existence of supportive financial institutions represents a crucial factor, especial-
ly if this tends to favor the acquisition of information about cooperatives’ credit riskiness (Bonin et al, 
1993; Smith, 2001). 
Moreover, these studies also tend to stress that institutions can reduce agency costs between owner-
ship and management, thus rendering less acute the incentive problem of free-riding by team members, 
and encouraging mutual monitoring (Staber, 1989; Bartlett et al, 1992; Bonin et al, 1993; Bayo-
Moriones et al, 2002). As a result, this may allow cooperatives to achieve even better productivity and 
performance than conventional firms. 
It is important to point out that this literature tends to emphasize at least two additional important 
aspects. The first one is that conventional economic indicators of performance and efficiency provide an 
incomplete basis for comparing cooperative and capitalist firms, since these enterprises operate under, at 
least partially, different sets of objectives (Bartlett et al, 1992). Indeed, it can be argued that the major 
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discriminant between cooperative and capitalist firms lies in the role ascribed to capital: in the former, 
capital is an instrument necessary to realize the ultimate aim of those that decide to join in a cooperative, 
would this be the satisfaction of a need, the procurement of a job, and so on; by contrast, in the latter 
capital is both instrument and ultimate aim. Put it in other words, beside economic purposes, coopera-
tives also pursue social goals; therefore, the role of relational goods – often able to counterbalance free-
riding and promote economic performance – cannot be disregarded (Zamagni, 2005). On this regard, the 
mutual aid concept, which is the pivotal principle of the cooperative logic, implies that the most impor-
tant assets of the firm are the members themselves, who are mutually reliant on one another to produce 
the sociability that makes membership in the firm worthwhile (Alchian et al, 1988). So that, a distinctive 
set of firm-specific resources is what could be called “relational capital”, with this meaning the set of 
intangible assets in the form of social relations and social values – embedded in the local community, 
and reproduced through the interactions taking place within it – which play a crucial role in the eco-
nomic governance of cooperatives, in the sense that they facilitate the processes that support economic 
activity and economic transactions by protecting property rights, enforcing contracts, and taking col-
lective action to provide appropriate physical and organizational infrastructure (Dixit, 2007).  
The second aspect stressed, perhaps even more relevant, is that the evidence contradicts mainstream 
theoretical predictions, as cooperative firms still represent (at least in some countries) a long lasting and 
significant phenomenon (Stiglitz, 2004; Zamagni, 2005).5 Therefore, this seems to suggest that the fi-
nancial issue has been governed and concretely tackled in some way, and where this has not occurred, it 
turned out to be a severe impediment to the development of cooperatives (Zevi, 2005).6 
With regard to the Italian case, in order to stimulate the capitalization of cooperative firms through 
the conferment of funds by third parties, the 59/1992 Law introduced the figure of financial backer 
member (i.e. socio sovventore), a category of partners having the role of financiers, but not engaging 
in the mutualistic exchange. By attributing to these external members up to one third of votes in the 
company meetings, this reform, and more generally those introduced in the last fifteen years in most 
European countries, altered the traditional cooperative principle “one head, one vote”, hence – at least 
potentially – the governance of these firms. 7 However, lacking so far any clear-cut answer as to the ac-
tual impact of the legislative changes introduced in the Nineties, it should not be neglected to consider 
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that the very reason motivating them was the need to attract the resources, scarce for cooperatives, re-
quired to foster growth. So that, the figure of financial backer member, along with the participatory 
rights it assigns, can be regarded functional to fulfil the instrumental role of capital in cooperative 
firms. And indeed, in order to reconcile the non-profit nature of cooperatives with the profitability 
strategy of financial backer members, so as to increase the amount of financial resources that could 
have been attracted, the 59/1992 Law established that these financiers, beside the vote right previous-
ly mentioned, could also receive a remuneration higher than the one assigned to cooperator members, 
even though this extra-dividend could not be greater than 2%. Whether or not this reconcilement of 
interests has been achieved is still debated among observers, who also question the effectiveness of 
the reform itself. On this regard, it has been argued that the 1992 Law did not respond adequately to 
the needs that motivated it, since the amount of financial resources it has been able to mobilize did not 
match cooperatives’ requirements, possibly because the new financial instruments have never been 
sold in official financial markets (La Loggia Albanese, 2003; Salani, 2005; Zevi, 2005). 
A further relevant issue characterizing the Italian case is that until 2003, although most of the cor-
porate law regulating corporations applied also to cooperatives, an important element of differentia-
tion in the discipline of these two business types was relative to the financial instruments they could 
access, since an institutional constraint bounded the sources of external financing available to cooper-
atives. Afterwards, with the 2003 corporate law reform, the lawmaker acknowledged cooperatives the 
possibility of using a wider range of financial instruments. However, given the relatively short time 
that has elapsed since then, it seems reasonable to expect that the effects of this reform (both in terms 
of financing and corporate governance), will be displayed only after a longer time will have passed, so 
that bank credit can still be regarded the main source of external financing for cooperatives.  
Considering the arguments so far discussed it can be argued that – although banks represent the 
primary source of external financing also for partnerships, and a nonetheless important channel of re-
sources acquisition for corporations – financial development can be particularly relevant in the case of 
cooperatives, as it might mitigate some of the previously discussed difficulties experienced by these 
firms, hence contributing to cater their financing requirement. 
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3. THE INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEMENTARITY APPROACH 
 
The concept of institutional complementarity appeared recently in the economic literature dealing 
with the importance of institutions in the economy and varieties of capitalism. Intuitively the term “insti-
tutional complementarity” refers to situations in which an interdependence among institutions occurs. 
The relevance of this relationship is due to the fact that since each institution defines a set of constraints, 
incentives and possibilities that determine agents’ strategies, the influence of one institution is reinforced 
when a complementary institution is present (Amable, 2000). However, complementarity has a variable 
impact depending on the general context in which such a relationship is embedded (Boyer, 2005).  
Several elaborations of the institutional complementarity hypothesis and its implications have been 
proposed in the literature. Amongst these, Aoki (2001) argues that the relationships among various mar-
ket governance mechanisms in one economy at one point in time may be complementary in the sense 
that the effectiveness (or the presence) of one governance mechanism can be reinforced, either directly 
or indirectly, by the presence of a particular mechanism in the same or embedding domain. For instance, 
market-supporting moral codes, inducing contracts’ self-enforceability, can be complementary to a just 
system of the rule of law (Aoki, 2001, p. 87).8 Using a simple model, the author shows that in the pres-
ence of institutional complementarities across domains, the prevailing institutional arrangements are not 
necessarily Pareto improving, as they may be Pareto sub-optimal, as well as Pareto non-rankable. This is 
so because, due to their bounded rationality in perception and choice, agents cannot strategically 
coordinate their choices across different domains, even if they participate in them simultaneously.  
Another interesting study is the work of Boyer (2005), who points out that the institutional comple-
mentarity hypothesis is able to elucidate many stylized facts about the evolution and diversity of institu-
tional architectures. In particular, institutional complementarities explain that most benchmarking expe-
riments do not deliver the expected results since the web of past interdependency between institutions 
hinders the adoption of new ones. In Boyer’s (2005) conceptualization, two institutions E  and 'E  are 
complementary if the performance R  of the conjunction of E  and 'E  is superior to the performance of 
each institution considered separately: 
 ( ) ( )EREER >',    and   ( ) ( )'', EREER > .                                                                                       (1) 
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Therefore, in this analysis complementarity requires that the conjunction of two institutions is Pareto 
improving with respect to the existence of only one of the two entities. 
With regard to the sphere of applicability of the institutional complementarity theory, Amable et al. 
(2005) argue that this approach allows a theoretically grounded interpretation of the persistent diversity 
of industrial relations models. In a stylized model of an economy with two strategic actors, a labor union 
and firm management,9 a taxonomy of four different types of industrial relations is identified according 
to union’s relative strength and the strategy followed by each side, under the influence of external credi-
tors. This taxonomy is then interpreted in terms of the institutional complementarity approach of which, 
according to these authors, two definitions can be conceived. In a first meaning, referring to a measure 
of performance, and thus close to Boyer’s (2005) definition, strong and influential financial markets are 
complementary to a weak union, whilst less influential financial markets are complementary to coopera-
tive relations between union and management. In fact, both configurations lead to a higher survival 
probability for the firm. With respect to the second definition - close to Aoki’s (2001) conceptualization - 
this refers to the concept of dynamic stability and identifies, once again, a complementary relation be-
tween weak financial markets and cooperative strategies, since strong financial markets have a destabi-
lizing effect. 
Interestingly, Nicita et al. (2004) apply the concept of institutional complementarity to the relation-
ship intervening between corporate governance and corporate finance. The authors explain the emer-
gence and persistence of diversity in corporate models in terms of the emergence of institutional com-
plementarities between firm’s technological and financial structures. In a model analyzing the trade-off 
between equity and debt financing in corporate governance, the authors show that, whilst Williamson’s 
(1988) transaction costs approach considers the choices on the financial domain as an endogenous adap-
tation to a given technological domain, an opposite direction of causality may also hold: technological 
choices may be an endogenous adaptation to given financial choices. Moreover, when both the directions 
of causality hold, some self-enforcing equilibria across the two domains can prevail, so that this provides 
some insights against the tendency towards convergence proposed by corporate governance models. 
Basili et al. (2004) develop a principal-agent model investigating the conditions which make the use 
of trust beneficial for the parties involved in a transaction, and show that since trust generates costs, the 
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willingness to reciprocate does not suffice by itself to resort to trust. By contrast, the presence of com-
plementary institutions induces cooperation between individuals, thus representing a crucial variable to 
foster the choice of trust (rather than contracts) as a mechanism for governing transactions. 
With regard to the empirical research on the issue of institutional complementarities, only a few stu-
dies have been so far proposed in the literature. Among these, Ernst (2003) estimates a multiplicative 
interaction model analyzing the interrelations that may exist between specific institutional arrangements 
prevailing on financial and labor markets, and that may produce effects on macroeconomic outcomes. 
The analysis, performed using data on output growth in 27 manufacturing industries in 19 OECD coun-
tries over the period 1979-1995, provides support to the hypothesis of institutional complementarities 
between specific configurations of financial and industrial relations: they explain an important part of 
within industry variation among countries. More in detail, concentrated ownership structures and 
unionized industrial relations are complementary in promoting growth in industries with high skill levels 
and also in bank financed industries, whereas ownership dispersion and labor market flexibility foster 
growth in equity financed industries. 
In the Varieties of Capitalism literature, Hall et al. (2004) test the hypothesis that institutional com-
plementarities occur across sub-spheres of the macroeconomy. By distinguishing the structure of labor 
relations and corporate governance prevailing in coordinated market economies and liberal market 
economies, the authors argue that if the institutionalized practices typical of each of these two typologies 
are complementary, then they should exert an impact on economic growth. In order to carry out a direct 
test of the institutional complementarity hypothesis, Hall et al. (2004) employ multiplicative interaction 
effects between variables proxying for institutions operating in the spheres of corporate governance and 
labor relations. Since these interaction terms are found to significantly exert a positive impact on growth, 
the authors conclude that this is empirical evidence in favor to the existence of complementarities be-
tween the two spheres considered. 
The conclusions reached on both theoretical and empirical grounds by the analyses so far discussed 
allow to argue that taking into account the issue of institutional complementarity makes it prominent to 
study the effects of interacting institutions, rather than simply recognize that ‘institutions matter’, as any 
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policy recommendation aimed at introducing a structural reform should consider the coherence and log-
ic of the whole institutional structure (Amable, 2000). 
 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This work intends to empirically assess the relationship existing between local banking development 
and the growth of Italian firms, with a special focus on cooperatives. More precisely, the interest is in 
investigating whether local banking development impacts differently on the growth of cooperative firms, 
as compared to partnerships and corporations (henceforth, non-cooperative firms).10 The reasoning set 
out in sub-section 2.1, should have clarified that the cooperative legal form has still strong implications 
in terms of financial structure of these firms, structure characterized – more than for any other typology – 
by the relevance of bank financing. So that, although it is not disputed that, in general, the benefits of a 
more developed banking sector are contingent upon firm financial structure, the working hypothesis is 
that these benefits could be especially marked for cooperatives, given their institutional structure.11 In 
order to address the research question, the empirical analysis tests this hypothesis by applying the insti-
tutional complementarity approach à la Aoki (2001): the interest is in assessing whether specific fea-
tures of banking institutions (i.e. their degree of development) and of firms (i.e. the legal form they as-
sume) are complementary in the sense that the effectiveness of cooperatives (evaluated in terms of their 
growth rate) is reinforced by the presence of more developed local financial intermediaries.  
To carry out this test, following the extant empirical literature on institutional complementarity, a 
multiplicative interaction model is specified, so that the impact of local banking development on firm 
growth is allowed to differ between cooperatives, on one side, and non-cooperative firms, on the other 
side.12 In other words, in this model the partial effect of local banking development (BRANCH) on firm 
growth (GROWTH) is made conditional on firm’s legal structure (COOP). More precisely, the marginal 
effect of BRANCH is given by 
 
COOP
BRANCH
GROWTH
INTEBRANCH ∗+=∂
∂ ββ ˆˆ ,                                                              (2) 
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where BRANCHβˆ  is the marginal effect of local banking development on the growth of non-cooperative 
firms, whilst COOPINTE ∗βˆ is the estimated coefficient on the interaction term multiplied by the condi-
tioning dichotomous variable COOP, which is equal to 1 when the condition “firm is a cooperative” is 
met. From equation (2) it follows that the marginal effect of local banking development on the growth of 
cooperative firms is INTEBRANCH ββ ˆˆ + . In order to test the significance of (2), it is necessary to compute 
the standard error of this quantity, which is given by: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 212 ˆˆcov2ˆvarˆvarˆ INTEBRANCHINTEBRANCH COOPCOOP ββββσ ++= .                                           (3) 
 
The analysis carried out in the paper refers to manufacturing firms. However, since cooperatives op-
erate in a number of different sectors, from food industry to a broad range of services, as well as social 
activities, this is a limitation. Future research is, therefore, called to fill this gap. 
The following sub-sections present the measures of firm growth and local banking development, and 
discuss the other variables included in the empirical specification, as well as the econometric strategy 
adopted. 
 
 
4.1 Measuring firm growth 
 
To test the previously discussed research question, it is first necessary to define the measure of firm 
growth employed in the empirical analysis. Real sales are the chosen indicator of growth; therefore, the 
dependent variable is the annual growth rate of firm’s real sales. 
Although several other measures have been used in the literature on firm growth, focusing on sales 
appears to be appropriate for a series of reasons. Firstly, beside employment, this is the most widely 
used indicator in empirical growth research (Delmar, 1997) and there seems to be an emerging consen-
sus that if only one indicator is to be chosen as a measure of firm growth, this should be sales (Hoy et al, 
1992; Sutton, 1997; Ardishvili et al, 1998; Delmar et al, 2003). Secondly, data on sales are relatively 
easily accessible and are insensitive to capital intensity and degree of integration (Delmar et al, 2003). 
Thirdly, sales are a suitable indicator across different conceptualizations of the firm (Davidsson et al, 
2000). Finally, demand and, therefore, sales are a precursor of growth in other indicators (Flamholtz, 
1986; Delmar, 1997). Despite the aforementioned advantages, drawbacks of sales as a growth indicator 
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are that this measure is sensitive to currency exchange rates and inflation. This latter problem, however, 
is not a concern in this work, since firms’ growth rates are computed on real sales.13  
 
 
4.2 Measuring local banking development 
 
Following Benfratello et al. (2006), local banking development is measured for province p and year 
t as number of bank branches normalized by population: 
 
pt
pt
pt population
esbankbranch
BRANCH = ,  where p=1,…,103; t=1995,…,2003.                                              (4) 
 
This variable describes the structure of the banking system in the provinces and, in particular, captures the 
geographic expansion of banks within the market (Bonaccorsi di Patti et al, 2001b). One main advantage 
of using BRANCH to measure local financial development is that this variable is available on a homoge-
neous basis for long periods of time (Benfratello et al, 2006). 
 
 
4.3 The econometric specification 
 
As already mentioned, in the empirical model the dependent variable is the annual growth rate of 
firm’s real sales (GROWTH), while BRANCH is the main explanatory variable. The vector of other re-
gressors includes the following variables accounting for firm specific, local market and sectoral charac-
teristics: firm size (EMPLOY), which is measured as number of employees and, according to the rele-
vant literature in the field, could exert either a relevant or insignificant impact on firm growth;14 firm age 
(AGE), expected to be negatively related to GROWTH;15 firm cash flow (CASHFLOW), which is 
measured as the sum of declared income, depreciation and quiescence fund scaled by total assets, and is 
a proxy for internally generated finance (Carpenter et al, 2002), hence for firm liquidity constraints (Fa-
giolo et al, 2006);16 the ratio of bank loans (i.e. short and long-term bank debts) on firm’s total assets 
(BANKDEBT), indicating the proportion of bank debt a firm employs to finance its assets; a dummy 
variable distinguishing between different firms’ legal structures (COOP), taking on the value of 1 for 
cooperatives and 0 for non-cooperative firms; an interaction term (INTE) between BRANCH and COOP, 
accounting for the possibility that the impact of local banking development on firm growth varies with 
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firm legal structure; a dichotomous variable taking on the value of 1 if the firm belongs to a group and 
zero otherwise (GRU); (the log of) provincial population (POP) as a measure for province size; provin-
cial real per capita income (RPI), proxying for local wealth; a dichotomous variable taking on the value 
of 1 for Centre Northern provinces and 0 for Southern ones (CEN-NORTH); three dummy variables dis-
tinguishing between firms operating in the supplier dominated, scale intensive, or specialized suppliers 
sectors (PAV), to control for sectoral heterogeneity within the manufacturing industry (the control group 
is the science based sector);17 finally, time dummies are included to control for year fixed effects.18 In or-
der to mitigate any potential simultaneity bias all variables have been lagged one year.19 
The econometric specification is estimated by applying the technique of panel data. It is worth men-
tioning that rather than estimating separate equations for cooperative and non-cooperative firms, the 
empirical analysis is implemented on the whole sample. Then, by introducing the dummy variable 
COOP and the interaction term INTE, it is possible to distinguish between firms’ legal structures and 
analyze if local banking development impacts differently on the growth of diverse typologies of enter-
prises. Such an empirical strategy presents two main advantages: firstly, the number of cooperatives 
present in the original dataset is rather limited20; secondly, using the multiplicative interaction term 
INTE allows to test directly for the presence of complementary relationships between specific features 
of the banking system and of business types. 
For a more detailed description of the variables presented in this section and for their main summary 
statistics see tables 2 and 3, respectively. 
 
[Insert tables 2 and 3] 
 
 
 
5. DATA 
 
The dataset used to implement the econometric analysis covers the nine-year period 1995-2003 and 
has been derived combining information obtained from three main sources. Firstly, data on firms come 
from the last three waves of the survey “Indagine sulle imprese manifatturiere” conducted with triennial 
cadence by Capitalia’s observatory on small and medium sized enterprises. The sample of Italian manu-
facturing firms used in the surveys is stratified and randomly selected for firms with 11 to 500 em-
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ployees, while it is by census for firms with more than 500 employees. Data collected through the sur-
veys are both qualitative and quantitative. Qualitative information is obtained by dispensing a question-
naire to sample firms and is referred to the end of the three-year period of each survey wave, whilst 
quantitative data are obtained from examining firms’ yearly balance sheets. 
Information collected through the questionnaire, which is made up of six sections, covers a number 
of aspects. The first section gathers information on establishment year, legal form, prevailing sector of 
activity, ownership and control, and participation in consortia activities. The second section collects data 
on employment, whilst the third one examines investment and R&D activities, and their financing. The 
fourth section is concerned with the internationalization process, and covers aspects such as the export 
activity, its geographical distribution, foreign direct investments etc. The fifth part of the questionnaire 
analyzes firm’s market and gives information on distributive channels and characteristics of main com-
petitors. Finally, the sixth section deals with the issue of firm financing, and contains questions regard-
ing banking relationships, the access to the latest financial instruments, the use of financial incentives 
and several other pieces of information. 
The dataset for the period 1995-2003 is made up of 6,452 firms. Since not all firms are present in 
each survey wave, the panel is unbalanced and made up of 28,185 observations. A careful examination 
of the original dataset showed that in some cases the year of firm establishment was taking on two clash-
ing values. To correct these inconsistencies, and homogenize the sample, the mean value of the two 
clashing years has been imputed when the time span was less than a decade, whilst excluding from the 
sample observations for which the time span elapsing between the two clashing years was longer than 
ten years. After operating these adjustments, the sample consists of 25,491 observations. 
With respect to the sub-sample of cooperatives, this includes 190 firms, for a total of 831 observations. 
Of these, 26.3% (amounting to 219 observations) operate in Southern regions, whilst 73.7% (i.e. 612 
observations) are run in Centre Northern ones. Moreover, regarding the Pavitt sectoral distribution of 
sampled cooperatives, 160 firms (for a total of 696 observations) belong to the supplier dominated 
sector, 21 cooperatives (amounting to 96 observations) operate in the scale intensive sector, 9 firms 
(amounting to 39 observations) are in the specialized suppliers sector, whilst none of the cooperatives 
included in the sample belongs to the science based sector. As far as the number of employees is con-
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cerned, 26.3% cooperatives (amounting to 216 observations) employ between 11 and 20 workers, 
44.2% (for a total of 405 observations) have between 21 and 50 employees, 22.1% firms (equal to 153 
observations) employ between 51 and 100 workers, 3.2% (amounting to 27 observations) have be-
tween 101 and 250 employees, finally, 4.2% cooperatives (amounting to 30 observations) employ be-
tween 251 and 500 workers.21 
After correcting for the presence of outliers, and excluding sole traders and firms classified in the 
category “other legal structures”, the number of observations for each variable employed in the empiri-
cal investigation is reported in table 3.22 
A second source of data comes from the Bank of Italy and regards the provincial distribution of 
branches for each Italian bank over the period considered in the analysis. Finally, figures on provincial 
population and real value added are drawn from the Italian National Statistical Institute (ISTAT). 
 
 
 
6. RESULTS 
 
Estimation results are presented in tables 4-8. Since the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test al-
ways favors the linear regression model against the random effects one, figures reported in these tables 
are obtained from running pooled regressions. All estimations have been carried out by using robust 
standard errors. Looking at table 4, MOD1 reports the results for the general model of firm growth. 
Since some of the control variables turn out to be not statistically significant, the general-to-simple pro-
cedure of reiterated elimination is applied to the specification of MOD1 and several nested models are 
estimated. Firstly, being CEN-NORTH the less statistically significant variable, this is excluded from 
the model and estimations are re-run on MOD2. Then, since results obtained for MOD2 reveal that POP 
is not statistically significant, this is not included in MOD3, which is the final model.23 Estimation re-
sults for MOD3 are reported in table 4. 
 
[Insert table 4] 
 
To begin with the comment on the significant control variables, figures for MOD3 in the above table 
suggest an inverse relationship between firm size and firm growth; this result, in line with most studies 
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(such as Mata, 1994; Weiss, 1998; Audretsch et al, 1999; Becchetti et al, 2002), rejects Gibrat’s law of 
proportionate effects, according to which firm growth should be independent of size. A negative impact 
on GROWTH is also found for AGE and this suggests - in line with the a priori expectations and the 
findings of studies as Glancey (1998) and Davidsson et al. (2002) - that younger firms grow faster. 
Moreover, the results show that CASHFLOW is inversely related with firm growth,24 and that firms 
employing a larger amount of bank debt (BANKDEBT) and those belonging to a group have higher 
growth rates (GRU). It is, then, found that firms located in less wealthy provinces grow more (RPI) and 
this result could be interpreted as evidence of a convergence effect. Finally, firms operating in supplier 
dominated (PAV1), scale intensive (PAV2), and specialized suppliers (PAV3) sectors grow less than 
those working in the science based sector (PAV4). 
Passing to the main variables of the investigation, the results suggest that, other things being equal, 
cooperatives tend to grow less than non-cooperative firms (COOP). This result would seem to support 
those studies claiming that the institutional characteristics of cooperative firms pose constraints to their 
performance (see, for instance, Vitaliano, 1983; Putterman, 1993). Moreover, the empirical evidence 
shows that local banking development is an important determinant of firm growth: the sign on 
BRANCH suggests that local banking development has a positive impact on the growth of non-
cooperative firms. The beneficial effect of BRANCH on GROWTH is even stronger for cooperative 
firms, since the positive sign on the interaction term INTE indicates that as local banking markets be-
come more developed, cooperatives tend to grow at a rate higher than non-cooperative firms. This result 
seems to provide evidence in favor to the existence of a relationship of institutional complementarity in 
the sense à la Aoki (2001): the effectiveness of cooperative firms, measured in terms of their growth rate, 
is reinforced by the presence of more developed local banking institutions. In order to evaluate this find-
ing, it should be recalled that, as pointed out in sub-section 2.1, cooperatives’ financial structure is such 
that they still rely more than other firms on bank financing, since reforms as the 59/1992 did not respond 
adequately to the need of stimulating the capitalization of these firms, and the corporate law in force be-
fore 2003 bounded the sources of external financing they could access. At the same time, however, their 
atypical property rights structure implies that cooperatives face more difficulties in raising the required 
external capital (Putterman, 1993; Dow, 2003), due to the problem of guarantees offered to third parties 
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financing the firm (Ben-Ner, 1988; Cook 1995; Jossa and Cuomo, 1997; Schlicht, 1997). So that, consi-
dering these arguments, the evidence obtained could be interpreted as suggesting that banking develop-
ment allows financial intermediaries to better collect and process the information embedded in the lo-
cal market, therefore reducing the scope for moral hazard and adverse selection (Goldsmith, 1969; 
Greenwood et al, 1990). In turn, this tends to favor the reproduction of some cooperatives’ firm-
specific resources, as social relations and social values, which are embedded in the local community 
and are important for the economic governance of these firms (see sub-section 2.1). So that, it could 
be through these channels that banking development particularly enhances the growth of coopera-
tives.25 And this seems to be evidence in favor to Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Benfratello et al. 
(2006), who show that financial development especially benefits firms mostly dependent on banks for 
their external financing. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the variables BRANCH and INTE are statistically significant when 
considered individually and also when tested jointly. 
 
 
6.1 Robustness checks 
 
A potential objection to the analysis presented is that BRANCH may be endogenous, if local bank-
ing markets tend to be more developed where firms’ growth rates are higher for exogenous reasons. A 
similar reasoning could apply also to BANKDEBT and CASHFLOW. Therefore, to address this poten-
tial issue MOD3 is re-estimated by testing for endogeneity. The instruments used to implement this 
check are: the provincial area in square kilometers (AREA); the number of municipalities present in the 
province (MUNI); the geographical dummy CEN-NORTH; one lag of BANKDEBT, and CASHFLOW, 
also this lagged once. Results from this estimation are reported in table 5.  
 
[Insert table 5] 
 
Figures for MOD3 in the above table show that the Wu-Hausman and Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests 
find no evidence of endogeneity; moreover, the Hansen-Sargan test reveals that the instruments em-
ployed are valid. Therefore, the results previously discussed for MOD3 are fully confirmed. 
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To check the robustness of the empirical specification, some new variables are then introduced. In 
order to account for the impact of investments on firm growth, the model is estimated by including the 
variable INV, measured as investments in installation, machinery, and equipment on total assets.26 Re-
sults from this check are presented in column MOD4 of table 5. Figures obtained for INV show that, as 
expected, firms investing more have a higher growth rate. Moreover, the previous findings continue to 
be valid, as no change is registered neither for the core variables of this study (BRANCH, COOP, INTE), 
nor for the control ones. 
The next step of the robustness analysis is to include INV among the endogenous regressors in the 
specification testing for endogeneity, since also INV may be endogenous, at least potentially. To carry 
out the two stage least squares regression, beside the instruments previously used, INV lagged once is 
included as well. Results obtained from this check on MOD4 do not show evidence of endogeneity (see 
table 5), thus confirming the conclusions discussed in the previous section. 
To take the robustness analysis a step further, the original specification (MOD1) is estimated by 
changing the dependent variable: firm growth is now measured as the annual growth rate of employees 
(GROWTH2).27 Furthermore, EMPLOY is replaced with SIZE1 (measured as the log of real sales lagged 
once), and INV is included as well. Results from this sensitivity check are reported in column MOD5 of 
table 6. 
 
[Insert table 6] 
 
Figures for MOD5 in the above table show that, although some control variables are no longer sig-
nificant, the main conclusions of this study are confirmed: local banking development is beneficial for 
the growth of non-cooperative firms (BRANCH); this positive impact is even more marked for coopera-
tives (INTE), thus suggesting that financial development contributes to mitigate some of the initial dis-
advantages that cooperatives - compared to other enterprises - experience (COOP). These same conclu-
sions are reached also when firm size is first measured by (the log of) total assets lagged once - SIZE2 - 
(MOD6 in table 6) and then by EMPLOY (MOD7 in table 6). 
As a further check, since firm growth in one period is likely to be affected by unobserved area spe-
cific factors, which may be at work also in other periods, the robustness analysis clusters observations at 
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the province level. Indeed, clustering makes allowance of within zone correlation of the error terms over 
time, so that it is necessary to correct standard errors and tests statistics for within cluster correlation. 
The regressions re-run by clustering on provinces are relative to MOD3 (table 4), MOD4 (table 5), and 
the models having GROWTH2 as dependent variable (table 6). Figures from these estimations are pre-
sented in table 7. 
 
[Insert table 7] 
 
Some other checks performed regard the inclusion in all regressions of firm’s return on equity 
(ROE), previously not included for the expected collinearity with CASHFLOW. In all cases, results (not 
reported, but available from the author upon request) remain basically unchanged, thus supporting the 
major conclusions of this research. 
 
[Insert table 8] 
 
Table 8 reports figures on the significance of the quantity of interest (the impact of BRANCH on 
GROWTH when COOP=1), computed by applying expression (3), and on the relevant marginal effects.28 
 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of this paper has been to empirically investigate whether local financial development influ-
ences the growth of Italian firms. More precisely, to assess if the degree of development of local credit 
markets impacts differently on the growth of diverse business types, the empirical analysis allowed the 
effect of local banking development on firm growth to differ between cooperative and non-cooperative 
firms. 
The econometric investigation, implemented on a sample of Italian firms for the period 1995-2003, 
leads to two main conclusions. The first one is that, compared to non-cooperative firms, cooperatives 
tend to grow less. In fact, the empirical evidence seems to suggest that, even after controlling for firm 
specific and local market characteristics, cooperatives exhibit a lower growth rate. Thus, this result would 
seem to support those studies claiming that the institutional characteristics of cooperative firms pose con-
straints to their performance (see, for instance, Vitaliano, 1983; Putterman, 1993). 
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A second result, which is also the major conclusion of this research, is that local banking develop-
ment is a determinant of firm growth, since firms operating in more developed credit markets are found 
to have higher growth rates. Therefore, this seems to indicate that the characteristics of the context in 
which firms operate influence their performance (Boyer, 2005). Even more importantly, the results sug-
gest that the beneficial effect of local financial development is stronger for cooperative firms: as local 
banking markets become more developed, cooperatives tend to grow at a rate higher than non-
cooperative firms. This seems to be empirical evidence in favor to the existence of a relationship of in-
stitutional complementarity between local banking institutions and cooperative firms, as the effective-
ness of cooperatives, evaluated in terms of their growth rate, appears to be reinforced by the presence of 
more developed local financial intermediaries.  
This conclusion, in line with studies claiming the importance of supportive financial institutions in 
favoring cooperatives’ flourishing and success (Estrin et al, 1988; Bonin et al, 1993; Smith, 2001; Ma-
thews, 2002; Stiglitz, 2004, amongst others), could be interpreted as suggesting that banking develop-
ment allows financial intermediaries to better collect and process the information embedded in the lo-
cal market, therefore reducing the scope for moral hazard and adverse selection (Goldsmith, 1969; 
Greenwood et al, 1990). In turn, this tends to favor the reproduction of firm-specific resources, as so-
cial relations and social values, which are embedded in the local community and are important for the 
economic governance of cooperatives. So that, it could be through these channels that banking devel-
opment particularly enhances the growth of cooperatives. And this seems to be evidence in favor to 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Benfratello et al. (2006), who show that financial development espe-
cially benefits firms mostly dependent on banks for their external financing. 
Regarding the interpretation of these results at a policy level, it could be argued that initiatives 
aimed at promoting a relatively more deregulated banking system would represent an important step to-
wards the creation of an institutional context that strengthens firms, especially cooperatives, hence pro-
moting economic activity. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1It is worth mentioning that in this literature a large number of contributions have focused on cross-country analysis 
(see Levine, 1997 for a survey of the main studies), while fewer works have investigated within-country differences. 
 
2 The horizon problem concerns the impossibility for partners to recoup the self-financed capital invested in the 
firm when their expected tenure in the firm is shorter than the time it takes for the stream of discounted net re-
turns from the project to equal the initial cost of the investment. 
 
3 According to Pejovich (1992), two critical variables determining the availability of bank loans are cooperators’ 
time horizon and the length of bank credit. Members of a producer-owned firm would prefer to obtain bank loans 
when the length of the loan is longer than their time horizon with the firm. By contrast, banks would prefer to ex-
tend loans in the opposite case, that is when the length of the loan is shorter than the time horizon of members. Con-
sequently, cooperatives might not be able to obtain bank credit due to the mismatch between members’ time hori-
zon and the length of the bank loan. 
 
4 An applicable formal model of credit market failures has been proposed by Banerjee and Newman (1993). 
 
5 A number of studies have, in fact, stressed that the empirical base underlying the traditional theory of the co-
operative firm is very thin (see, amongst others, Stephen, 1984; Estrin and Jones, 1992; Ménard, 2004). 
 
6 However, Zamagni (2005) argues that the evidence alone does not suffice to invalidate an analytically proved 
theory. Therefore, future research on cooperation should devote a great deal of effort to promote the making of  
what he calls an “economic-civil theory of cooperation”. 
 
7 For a discussion of the European reforms introduced in the Nineties – as the 1991 Belgian Law, the 1992 Ital-
ian and French Laws, the 1992 Catalonian Law, and the 1993 Basques Law – see the volume edited by Monzon 
et al. (1996). 
   
8 Notice that in this example the system of the rule of law is a governance mechanism, whilst its justice is an 
attribute, a characteristic of this governance mechanism. 
 
9 Amable et al. (2005) argue that the type of financial relationship between the firm and the capital owner or the 
financial market will set a certain constraint on firm’s profitability, which will partly determine firm’s survival 
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probability. This will in turn shape both management and union strategies, hence influencing the outcome of the 
bargaining between these two actors. 
 
10 The Italian corporate law disciplines firms’ legal structures according to the principle of juristic personality. 
All legal forms recognized by the Italian lawmaker are present in the Capitalia database, under the classification 
here presented. A first typology is that of sole trader, a business entity having no separate existence from its 
owner. Basically, under this legal structure a person does business in his own name and under unlimited liabil-
ity. Secondly, have partnerships, unincorporated businesses without juristic personality since their legal perso-
nality is not separated from that of their members. These enterprises normally operate under the unlimited liabil-
ity of partners, although other forms (i.e. societa’ in accomandita semplice) have evolved in which only certain 
members have unlimited liability, whilst the others have limited liability. A third legal form is that of corpora-
tions, incorporated businesses which are legal entities effectively recognized as a (fictious) person by law. These 
enterprises are, in other words, juristic persons and operate under limited liability. Fourthly, have cooperative 
firms, hinging on the principle of mutual aid, which have legal personality and can operate under both limited 
and unlimited liability. Finally, Capitalia classifies the typologies established lately from the classical forms so 
far presented under the label “other legal structures”, among which figure the s.r.l. unipersonale (an incorpo-
rated company having a single owner), societa’ di professionisti (professionals’ company), and societa’ europea 
(European company). 
 
11 In this analytical framework, what matters are cooperative firms as a whole, that is as an organizational form 
having traits that, on one hand, still render it mostly dependent upon banking institutions and, on the other hand, 
make the bank-firm link complex. Thus, given the purpose of the empirical investigation, possible differentia-
tions in the financial structure of these firms are left aside. Yet, this latter aspect deserves further in depth in-
quiry, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, in future research. 
 
12 See Brambol et al. (2006) for an analysis of multiplicative interaction models. 
 
13 It is worth noting that it has been preferred to control for the sensitivity of sales to inflation, even though in 
Italy inflation rates are rather contained. 
 
14 Although Gibrat’s law of proportionate effects (1931) states that firm growth is independent of size, empirical 
research has not reached unequivocal conclusions. Indeed, while most studies rejected the model (Tschoegl, 
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1983; Evans, 1987; Dunne et al, 1989; Dunne et al, 1994; Mata, 1994; Weiss, 1998; Audretsch et al, 1999; Bec-
chetti et al, 2002), others found evidence in favor to Gibrat’s law (Chen et al, 1985; Kumar, 1985; Acs and Au-
dretsch, 1990; Wagner, 1992; Fulton et al, 1995; Diaz-Hermelo et al, 2004). In between these conclusions, Lotti 
et al. (2003) find that in some Italian manufacturing industries the behavior of Gibrat’s law depends on the life 
cycle of the firm. In particular, the law does not hold in the first year following start-up, when smaller entrants 
grow faster in order to achieve a size that enhances their survival likelihood. Thereafter, the law is not rejected, 
as smaller and larger entrants are not found to follow different growth patterns. 
 
15 Regarding the relationship between firm age and growth, the general pattern suggested by previous research is 
that young firms are more likely to grow faster (see, for instance, Glancey, 1998; Almus and Nerlinger, 1999; 
Wijewardena et al, 1999; Becchetti et al, 2002; Davidsson et al, 2002; Niskanen et al, 2005). 
 
16 The impact of cash flow on firm growth varies with the availability of external sources of financing, as the 
latter relax the link between growth and internal finance (Carpenter et al, 2002). 
 
17 This classification of the industrial sectors has been proposed by Pavitt (1984). 
 
18 The correlation matrix for the variables used in the estimations is reported in the appendix. 
 
19 An exception to this is represented by the variable COOP and by territorial and sectoral dummies. 
 
20 Yet, the intention for future research is to dispose of a much greater amount of observations on cooperatives.  
 
21 Regarding the composition of the sub-sample of cooperatives across the surveys considered in the analysis – 
spanning the triennia 1995-1997, 1998-2000, and 2001-2003 – 61% firms are present in one wave, 31.6% are 
included for six years, hence in two surveys, and 7.4% firms appear in all three waves. As explained by Attilio 
Pasetto – in charge for Capitalia’s Indagine sulle imprese manifatturiere – in order to keep in each wave a sig-
nificant quota of sample units belonging to the preceding surveys, and also to supplement the sample with new 
units, Capitalia uses the criterion of partial re-sampling of firms (rotation panel design). So that, differences in 
the firms appearing in the surveys are mainly due to the sampling method adopted. Moreover, as far as non-
responding units are concerned, these include firms that did not adhere to initiatives subsequent to the first one, 
those that run out of business, those whose number of employees fell below 11, and those not belonging to the 
manufacturing industry anymore.  
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22 Following Servèn (2003), the criterion used to operate the outliers correction is to consider as outliers all ob-
servations for which any of the variables lies beyond 10 standard deviation away from the mean. It is worth 
mentioning that sole traders have been excluded from the sample as the intention is to focus on enterprises. As 
regards the category “other legal structures”, this has not been considered since it includes very heterogeneous 
business types (see endnote 10). 
 
23 The variable PAV2 is not excluded from MOD3, even if not statistically significant, since – as an anonymous 
referee pointed out – PAV1, PAV2, and PAV3 are to be intended as an integrated set of variables. 
 
24 Recently, also Fagiolo et al. (2006) found that liquidity constrained firms are those that grow persistently more. 
The authors show that small and quite dynamic firms are capable to perform well, despite being cash-constrained. 
 
25 It is important to clarify that it would be erroneous to argue that the more banks are developed, the more firms 
tend to structure themselves as cooperatives, since this would imply to regard the degree of development of fi-
nancial intermediaries as driving individuals’ organizational choice. And, indeed, the institutional complemen-
tarity approach does not conflict with this, since one of its major implications is that the presence of institutional 
complementarity does not necessarily lead to the selection of a Pareto improving institutional arrangement. In 
fact, being a dynamic approach admitting multiple equilibria, institutional complementarity - as mentioned in 
Section 3 - does not rule out that the prevailing institutional arrangements may be Pareto sub-optimal, as well as 
Pareto non-rankable. This is so because, due to their bounded rationality in perception and choice, agents cannot 
strategically coordinate their choices across domains, even if they participate in them simultaneously (Aoki, 2001). 
 
26 The outliers correction for INV has been operated after having estimated the models 1-3. Results are unchanged 
when these models have been re-estimated after this correction.     
 
27 It has been argued that employment is a more informative indicator of organizational complexity than sales, 
and may be preferable if the focus is on the managerial implications of growth (Greiner, 1972; Churchill and 
Lewis, 1983). Moreover, some scholars have claimed that for resource and knowledge-based views of the firm, 
which consider firms as bundle of resources, growth analysis should focus on the accumulation of resources, 
such as employees (Penrose, 1959; Kogut and Zander, 1992). 
 
28 These figures regard the models from 3 to 7. 
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Level and area of analysis Measure of financial development Main finding
(continued)
Greater credit availability, which increases
investments level, since individuals and firms
are insured against the risks associated with
their liquidity needs
McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), 
Bencivenga et al . (1991), 
Levine (1992), Saint-Paul (1992)
Improvement in bank lending quality is the
main channel through which the American
intrastate branching reform influenced eco-
nomic growth
TABLE 1 - A taxomony of the literature on financial development
United States (50 states) during the period
1972-1992
Micro-level analysis on a sample of 30
countries over the period 1980-1991Demirgüç-Kunt et al . (1998) 
Jayaratne et al . (1996)
Better accounting and disclosure rules, and
better corporate governance through insti-
tutions, lower the costs of raising funds
from external sources, especially for firms
mostly reliant on external financing
Goldsmith (1969), Greenwood 
et al . (1990), Fernandez et al . 
(1994) 
Rajan and Zingales (1998), 
Benfratello et al . (2006)
Bank branching deregulation measured
through an indicator of intrastate branch
reform equal to 1 for states without restric-
tions on branching via mergers and acqui-
sitions
THEORETICAL STUDIES
EMPIRICAL STUDIES
Better screening and monitoring of inve-
stors by banks increase the marginal pro-
ductivity of capital, hence the efficiency of
investments 
Channels through which financial development impacts on the economy
Firms operating in countries having active
and more developed financial markets are
better able to obtain external finance and
grow faster 
A financial planning model predicts the max
growth rate firms can attain without long-
term external financing. These rates are
then compared with those realised by firms
in countries with different degrees of finan-
cial development   
Level and area of analysis Measure of financial development Main finding
Local indicator measuring how much more
likely an individual is to obtain credit in a
region, rather than in another one
United States during 1900-1940
The taxonomy has been drawn from the literature surveyed in Section 2 of the paper.
Financial development stimulates entrepre-
neurship, firm growth and the creation of
wealth
Beck et al . (2005) Firm-level survey database covering 54countries for the period 1995-1999
Guiso et al . (2004)
Beck et al . (2003)
Financial and institutional development
weakens the constraining effects of finan-
cial, legal and corruption obstacles to firm
growth, particularly for small firms
Firm-level survey database covering 44
countries for the period 1988-1997
Claims of deposit money banks on the
private sector as share of GDP, as a mea-
sure for financial intermediary development.
Value of outstanding shares on GDP, mea-
suring stock market development
Branch density, measured as number of
bank branches over population
Dehejia et al . (2003) Level and growth of state bank loans
By improving lending quality, banking deve-
lopment facilitates the shift from agriculture
to manufacture, has a positive impact on
human capital accumulation and on wealth
acquisition
Banking development is positively related
to firm size. This relationship is stronger for
firms more dependent on external financing
EMPIRICAL STUDIES
TABLE 1 (continued ) - A taxomony of the literature on financial development
Benfratello et al . (2006)
Local banking development has a positive
impact on firm innovative activity, espe-
cially for small firms strongly dependent on
external finance
Regional level analysis on Italian data for
the period 1989-1997
Provincial level analysis on Italy for the
period 1992-2000
Domestic bank credit to the private sector
on GDP
Variable
GROWTH Firm's annual growth rate of real sales
EMPLOY Firm's number of employees
SIZE Firm's total assets
AGE Firm age measured as current year minus year of establishment
CASHFLOW Firm’s declared income plus depreciation and quiescence fund scaled by total assets
BANKDEBT Short and long-term bank loans on firm's total assets
INV Investments in installation, machinery, and equipment on total assets
BRANCH Number of bank branches operating in a province normalised by population, scaled by 10000
COOP Dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if firm is a cooperative and 0 otherwise
GRU Dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if firm belongs to a group and 0 otherwise
POP Provincial population
RPI Provincial real per capita income
CEN-NORTH Dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if firm operates in a Centre Northern province and 0 otherwise
SOUTH Dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if firm operates in a Southern province and 0 otherwise
PAV1 Dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if firm operates in the supplier dominated sector and 0 otherwise
PAV2 Dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if firm operates in the scale intensive sector and 0 otherwise
PAV3 Dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if firm operates in the specialised suppliers sector and 0 otherwise
PAV4 Dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if firm operates in the science based sector and 0 otherwise
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GROWTH * 17479 3.35 17.21 -44.99 105.33
EMPLOY+ 17477 79 158 11 2,200
SIZE # 15570 8,194 20,941 12 376,483
AGE ++ 17479 24 17 0 191
CASHFLOW * 15570 12.99 8.27 -62.14 69.98
BANKDEBT * 15570 16.51 17.90 0.00 89.78
INV * 12893 9.712 11.433 0 77.09
BRANCH 17479 5.8423 1.4650 1.5531 10.2865
COOP 17479 0.0326 0.1775 0 1
GRU 17479 0.2279 0.4195 0 1
POP + 17479 1,050,100 1,068,675 89,775 3,775,765
RPI # 17479 21.4862 4.7012 9.3096 31.9725
CEN-NORTH 17479 0.8595 0.3475 0 1
SOUTH 17479 0.1405 0.3475 0 1
PAV1 17479 0.5147 0.4998 0 1
PAV2 17479 0.1767 0.3814 0 1
PAV3 17479 0.2577 0.4374 0 1
PAV4 17479 0.0509 0.2197 0 1
For the description of the variables see table 2. *In percentage terms; # In thousands of Euro; + In units; ++ 
Years.  All the other variables are dummies, with the exception of BRANCH (see table 2).
All variables are drawn from Capitalia except for: i) BRANCH, obtained by calculations on data ISTAT and Bank of Italy, ii) RPI and POP which are
drawn from ISTAT.  
TABLE 2 - Description of Variables
Description
TABLE 3 - Summary statistics
Dependent variable: GROWTH
MOD 1 MOD 2 MOD 3
EMPLOY -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019
0.0500 0.0490 0.0490
AGE -0.0334 -0.0335 -0.0332
0.0010 0.0010 0.0010
CASHFLOW -0.1094 -0.1094 -0.1095
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
BANKDEBT 0.0204 0.0204 0.0203
0.0510 0.0520 0.0520
BRANCH 0.4393 0.4282 0.3417
0.0270 0.0250 0.0220
COOP -5.1204 -5.0433 -5.1618
0.0840 0.0860 0.0780
INTE 1.0160 1.0053 1.0238
0.0380 0.0390 0.0360
GRU 1.4625 1.4692 1.4710
0.0010 0.0010 0.0010
POP 0.1886 0.2079
0.5460 0.4850
RPI -0.1611 -0.1709 -0.1393
0.0360 0.0080 0.0030
CEN-NORTH -0.1862
0.8270
PAV1 -2.6168 -2.6157 -2.6452
0.0040 0.0040 0.0030
PAV2 -0.6900 -0.6925 -0.6917
0.4590 0.4580 0.4580
PAV3 -1.6715 -1.6715 -1.6780
0.0690 0.0690 0.0680
LM Test 0.03 0.02 0.03
0.8731 0.8752 0.8710
Model Test 25.32 26.62 28.05
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.0452 0.0452 0.0452
F Test (BRANCH INTE) 5.430 5.730 5.960
0.0044 0.0033 0.0026
N. OBS 10,202 10,202 10,203
TABLE 4 - Estimation results
For the description of the variables see table 2. In italics are reported the p-values of the tests. The t
statistics (not reported) are based on robust standard errors. INTE is the interaction term between
BRANCH and COOP. With exception of this latter, and of territorial and industrial dummies, all the
explanatory variables have been lagged once, to avoid simultaneity. The variable POP is taken in
logarithm terms. Time dummies and constant included but not reported. LM test is the Breusch and
Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test for random effects. F test is a test of joint significance of the variables
indicated in round brackets. From MOD 1 to MOD 3 the general-to-simple procedure has been applied.
Dependent variable: GROWTH
MOD 3 MOD 4 MOD 4
(Endogeneity check) (Endogeneity check)
EMPLOY -0.0030 -0.0022 -0.0025
0.0330 0.0280 0.0850
AGE -0.0312 -0.0307 -0.0265
0.0470 0.0040 0.1130
CASHFLOW -0.0502 -0.1628 -0.1057
0.2570 0.0000 0.0780
INV 0.0868 0.0470
0.0000 0.4250
BANKDEBT 0.0306 0.0282 0.0280
0.0920 0.0170 0.1780
BRANCH 0.5197 0.3354 0.7099
0.1840 0.0400 0.1150
COOP -0.1849 -6.2213 -1.9194
0.9710 0.0750 0.7620
INTE 0.3242 1.0661 0.4618
0.6940 0.0600 0.6510
GRU 1.3665 1.1718 1.0709
0.0360 0.0120 0.1210
RPI -0.1939 -0.1664 -0.2869
0.0220 0.0010 0.0020
PAV1 -2.1004 -2.5744 -1.2849
0.0920 0.0040 0.3070
PAV2 -0.2441 -0.5146 0.5879
0.8510 0.5850 0.6540
PAV3 -1.3185 -1.2229 -0.4833
0.3010 0.1870 0.7080
LM Test 0.31
0.5762
Model Test 13.74 25.93 10.97
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.0594
UN R-squared 0.0505 0.0646
F Test (BRANCH INTE) 4.81
0.0081
Tests of endogeneity:
Wu-Hausman F test: 0.5904 0.6565
0.6213 0.6223
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 1.7777 2.6400
0.6198 0.6198
Hansen-Sargan statistic 
(overidentification test of all 
instruments)
1.765  
0.4138
4.375  
0.1122
N. OBS 5,205 7,988 3,858
TABLE 5 - Robustness: checking for endogeneity and including new regressors 
For the description of the variables see table 2. In italics are reported the p-values of the tests. The t statistics
(not reported) are based on robust standard errors. INTE is the interaction term between BRANCH and COOP.
With exception of this latter, and of territorial and industrial dummies, all the explanatory variables have been
lagged once, to avoid simultaneity. Time dummies and constant included but not reported. LM test is the
Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for random effects. F test is a test of joint significance of the
variables indicated in round brackets. The tests of endogeneity for the estimations on MOD 3 regard the
variables BRANCH, BANKDEBT, CASHFLOW, whilst those for the estimations on MOD 4 are for the variables
BRANCH, BANKDEBT, CASHFLOW and INV. In the first case, the instruments used are: the provincial area in
square kilometers (AREA), the number of municipalities (MUNI), the dummy CEN-NORTH, one lag of
BANKDEBT and one lag of CASHFLOW. In the second case the instruments include also one lag of the
variable INV.
Dependent variable: GROWTH2
MOD 5 MOD 6 MOD 7
EMPLOY -0.0024
0.0100
SIZE1 0.2754
0.0880
SIZE2 0.2618
0.0890
AGE -0.0568 -0.0576 -0.0483
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
CASHFLOW -0.0391 -0.0370 -0.0395
0.0580 0.0740 0.0540
INV 0.0471 0.0474 0.0464
0.0020 0.0020 0.0020
BANKDEBT 0.0076 0.0074 0.0127
0.4480 0.4630 0.1930
BRANCH 0.3941 0.3945 0.3621
0.0270 0.0270 0.0420
COOP -10.211 -10.359 -10.768
0.0030 0.0030 0.0020
INTE 1.8152 1.8356 1.9229
0.0010 0.0010 0.0010
GRU 0.1533 0.1482 0.8764
0.7080 0.7190 0.0260
POP 0.4989 0.4921 0.4920
0.0850 0.0890 0.0900
RPI -0.1903 -0.1898 -0.1915
0.0080 0.0080 0.0070
CEN-NORTH 0.0482 0.1044 0.2240
0.9520 0.8960 0.7800
PAV1 -0.4492 -0.4243 -0.5055
0.4760 0.5010 0.4220
PAV2 0.2694 0.2894 0.2082
0.6960 0.6750 0.7620
PAV3 -0.0417 -0.0260 -0.0442
0.9480 0.9670 0.9450
LM Test 0.550 0.540 0.590
0.4577 0.4605 0.4442
Model Test 7.03 6.99 6.97
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.0294 0.0293 0.030
F Test (BRANCH INTE) 8.96 9.08 9.22
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
N. OBS 4,065 4,065 4,065
TABLE 6 - Robustness: changing the dependent variable 
For the description of the variables see table 2. In italics are reported the p-values of the tests. The t statistics (not
reported) are based on robust standard errors. GROWTH2 is the annual growth rate of employees. SIZE1 is the log
of real sales, while SIZE2 is the log of total assets. INTE is the interaction term between BRANCH and COOP. With
exception of this latter, and of territorial and industrial dummies, all the explanatory variables have been lagged
once, to avoid simultaneity. Time dummies and constant included but not reported. LM test is the Breusch and
Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for random effects. F test is a test of joint significance of the variables indicated in
round brackets. 
(on) 
MOD 3
(on) 
MOD 4
(on) 
MOD 5
(on) 
MOD 6
(on) 
MOD 7
EMPLOY -0.0019 -0.0022 -0.0024
0.0480 0.0350 0.0180
SIZE1 0.2754
0.1480
SIZE2 0.2618
0.1380
AGE -0.0332 -0.0307 -0.0568 -0.0576 -0.0483
0.0010 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
CASHFLOW -0.1095 -0.1628 -0.0391 -0.0370 -0.0395
0.0000 0.0000 0.0630 0.0780 0.0530
INV 0.0868 0.0471 0.0474 0.0464
0.0000 0.0060 0.0060 0.0070
BANKDEBT 0.0203 0.0282 0.0076 0.0074 0.0127
0.0500 0.0100 0.3710 0.3870 0.1340
BRANCH 0.3417 0.3354 0.3941 0.3945 0.3621
0.0140 0.0200 0.0670 0.0670 0.0960
COOP -5.1618 -6.2213 -10.211 -10.359 -10.768
0.0870 0.0890 0.0070 0.0060 0.0040
INTE 1.0238 1.0661 1.8152 1.8356 1.923
0.0330 0.0710 0.0040 0.0030 0.0020
GRU 1.4710 1.1718 0.1533 0.1482 0.8764
0.0000 0.0110 0.7090 0.7280 0.0200
POP 0.4989 0.4921 0.4920
0.1130 0.1190 0.1250
RPI -0.1393 -0.1664 -0.1903 -0.1898 -0.1915
0.0000 0.0000 0.0090 0.0090 0.0090
CEN-NORTH 0.0482 0.1044 0.2240
0.9490 0.8890 0.7700
PAV1 -2.6452 -2.5744 -0.4492 -0.4243 -0.5055
0.0000 0.0000 0.4370 0.4600 0.3870
PAV2 -0.6917 -0.5146 0.2694 0.2894 0.2082
0.3530 0.4950 0.6480 0.6250 0.7300
PAV3 -1.6780 -1.2229 -0.0417 -0.0260 -0.0442
0.0240 0.0720 0.9450 0.9660 0.9420
Model Test 32.39 24.96 9.48 9.00 8.11
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.0452 0.0594 0.0294 0.0293 0.03
F Test (BRANCH INTE) 7.78 5.01 7.96 8.09 8.45
0.0007 0.0085 0.0006 0.0006 0.0004
N. OBS 10,203 7,988 4,065 4,065 4,065
For the description of the variables see table 2. In italics are reported the p-values of the tests. The t statistics
(not reported) are based on robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on provinces. GROWTH is the
annual growth rate of real sales, and GROWTH2 is the annual growth rate of employees. SIZE1 is the log of
real sales, while SIZE2 is the log of total assets. INTE is the interaction term between BRANCH and COOP.
With exception of this latter, and of territorial and industrial dummies, all the explanatory variables have been
lagged once, to avoid simultaneity. The variable POP is taken in logarithm terms. Time dummies and constant
included but not reported. F test is a test of joint significance of the variables indicated in round brackets. 
TABLE 7 - Robustness: clustering on provinces 
GROWTH
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
GROWTH 2
MOD 3 MOD 4 MOD 5
Est. coeff. of  BRANCH (1) 0.4393 0.3354 0.3941
Est. coeff. of INTE (2) 1.0160 1.0661 1.8152
Var of (1) 2.22E-02 2.66E-02 3.18E-02
Var of (2) 2.37E-01 3.21E-01 3.17E-01
COV. (1) (2) -1.37E-02 -1.79E-02 -1.55E-02
t-ratio 2.8362 2.5112 3.9200
MOD 6 MOD 7
Est. coeff. of  BRANCH (1) 0.3945 0.3621
Est. coeff. of INTE (2) 1.8356 1.9229
Var of (1) 3.18E-02 3.18E-02
Var of (2) 3.18E-01 3.15E-01
COV. (1) (2) -1.56E-02 -1.54E-02
t-ratio 3.9511 4.0661
MOD 3
(clustered)
MOD 4
(clustered)
MOD 5
(clustered)
Est. coeff. of  BRANCH (1) 0.3417 0.3354 0.3941
Est. coeff. of INTE (2) 1.0238 1.0661 1.8152
Var of (1) 1.85E-02 2.01E-02 4.54E-02
Var of (2) 2.24E-01 3.41E-01 3.68E-01
COV. (1) (2) -1.90E-02 -9.27E-03 -3.08E-02
t-ratio 3.0202 2.3942 3.7247
MOD 6
(clustered)
MOD 7
(clustered)
Est. coeff. of  BRANCH (1) 0.3945 0.3621
Est. coeff. of INTE (2) 1.8356 1.9229
Var of (1) 4.54E-02 4.63E-02
Var of (2) 3.67E-01 3.59E-01
COV. (1) (2) -3.05E-02 -3.22E-02
t-ratio 3.7636 3.9159
TABLE 8 - The impact of BRANCH on GROWTH when COOP=1
For the description of the variables see table 2. For the computation of the tests statistics see
expression (3) in the main body of the paper.
EMPLOY SIZE1 SIZE2 AGE CASHFLOW INV BANKDEBT BRANCH COOP GRU PAV1 PAV2 PAV3 PAV4 POP RPI CEN‐NORTH
EMPLOY 1
SIZE1 0.6913 1
SIZE2 0.6812 0.9427 1
AGE 0.1856 0.2269 0.2606 1
CASHFLOW 0.0160 ‐0.1439 ‐0.2076 0.0634 1
INV ‐0.0191 ‐0.0867 ‐0.1104 ‐0.0438 0.1928 1
BANKDEBT 0.0855 0.2941 0.3252 0.0739 ‐0.3714 ‐0.0927 1
BRANCH 0.0358 0.0716 0.0288 0.0486 0.0567 ‐0.0448 0.0392 1
COOP 0.0096 0.0189 0.0504 0.1315 ‐0.1184 0.0177 0.0231 ‐0.0126 1
GRU 0.4025 0.4603 0.4714 0.0423 ‐0.0301 ‐0.0526 0.0756 0.0428 ‐0.0674 1
PAV1 ‐0.0617 ‐0.0543 ‐0.0534 0.0159 ‐0.1261 ‐0.0002 0.1005 ‐0.0635 0.1210 ‐0.1172 1
PAV2 0.0103 0.0207 0.0216 0.0182 0.0443 0.0524 ‐0.0194 ‐0.0381 ‐0.0224 0.0289 ‐0.4740 1
PAV3 0.0326 0.0386 0.0310 ‐0.0313 0.0751 ‐0.0351 ‐0.0751 0.1269 ‐0.0964 0.0698 ‐0.6055 ‐0.2822 1
PAV4 0.0575 0.0099 0.0216 ‐0.0052 0.0591 ‐0.0212 ‐0.0444 ‐0.0440 ‐0.0429 0.0768 ‐0.2309 ‐0.1076 ‐0.1375 1
POP 0.0374 0.0333 0.0418 0.0926 0.0562 0.0049 ‐0.0693 ‐0.2204 ‐0.0760 0.0477 ‐0.1757 0.0646 0.0887 0.1098 1
RPI 0.0719 0.0955 0.0641 0.1351 0.1004 ‐0.0635 ‐0.0391 0.5622 ‐0.0775 0.0763 ‐0.1711 ‐0.0093 0.1683 0.0682 0.4361 1
CEN‐NORTH 0.0516 0.0621 ‐0.0067 0.0868 0.0971 ‐0.0218 ‐0.0025 0.6535 ‐0.0818 0.0006 ‐0.1173 ‐0.0093 0.1376 0.0070 0.0113 0.6559 1
For the description of the variables see table 2.
APPENDIX ‐ Correlation matrix
